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It is unclear whether reflective awareness of emotions is related to extent and intensity of implicit affective reactions. This study is the first to
investigate automatic brain reactivity to emotional stimuli as a function of trait emotional awareness. To assess emotional awareness the Levels of
Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) was administered. During scanning, masked happy, angry, fearful and neutral facial expressions were presented to
46 healthy subjects, who had to rate the fit between artificial and emotional words. The rating procedure allowed assessment of shifts in implicit
affectivity due to emotion faces. Trait emotional awareness was associated with increased activation in the primary somatosensory cortex, inferior
parietal lobule, anterior cingulate gyrus, middle frontal and cerebellar areas, thalamus, putamen and amygdala in response to masked happy faces. LEAS
correlated positively with shifts in implicit affect caused by masked happy faces. According to our findings, people with high emotional awareness show
stronger affective reactivity and more activation in brain areas involved in emotion processing and simulation during the perception of masked happy
facial expression than people with low emotional awareness. High emotional awareness appears to be characterized by an enhanced positive affective
resonance to others at an automatic processing level.
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INTRODUCTION
Trait emotional awareness is a cognitive skill reflecting individual dif-
ferences in the ability to recognize and describe emotion in oneself and
others (Lane et al., 1990). Lane and Schwartz (1987) proposed a model
of emotional-cognitive development that differentiates between five
levels of emotional development. The five levels in ascending order
are awareness of physical sensations (level 1), action tendencies
(level 2), single emotions (level 3), blends of emotions (level 4) and
blends of ‘blends of emotions’ (level 5, the capacity to appreciate com-
plexity in the experiences of self and other persons). A fundamental
tenet of this model is that individual differences in emotional aware-
ness reflect variations in the degree of differentiation and integration of
schemata used in emotional processing. Fundamental information for
such emotional processing schemata can be derived from the external
world or the internal world through introspection (Lane and Schwartz,
1987). A performance-based task, the Levels of Emotional Awareness
Scale (LEAS; Lane et al., 1990) has been developed to measure trait
emotional awareness.
The five levels of emotional awareness are hierarchically related, in
that, functioning at each level adds to and modifies the function of
previous levels but, importantly, does not eliminate them (Lane, 2008).
For example, blends of emotion (Level 4 experiences), compared with
action tendencies (Level 2), are assumed to be associated with more
differentiated representations of somatic sensations (Level 1). The feel-
ings associated with a given emotional response can be viewed as a
construction consisting of each of the levels of awareness up to and
including the highest level attained (Lane and Pollermann, 2002; Lane
and Garfield, 2005). The trait level of function is the level at which a
given individual typically functions (Lane, 2008).
The levels of emotional awareness can be mapped onto the distinc-
tion between implicit and explicit processes (Lane, 2000). Level 1
(bodily sensations) and Level 2 (action tendencies) phenomena are
critical components of emotional responses but, viewed in isolation,
cannot necessarily be considered indicators of emotions. The periph-
eral physiological arousal and action tendencies associated with emo-
tion are ‘implicit’ in the sense that they occur automatically and do not
require conscious processes to be executed efficiently. Levels 3, 4 and 5
consist of conscious (or explicit) emotional experiences at different
levels of complexity. The levels of emotional awareness theory puts
implicit and explicit processes on the same continuum. However, rela-
tively little research has been completed that explores the details of the
interactions across levels.
Research addressing the neural correlates of emotional awareness
has focused exclusively on controlled or explicit processing of emo-
tional information. Lane et al. (1998) found evidence that individual
differences in trait emotional awareness may at least in part be a func-
tion of the degree to which the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) par-
ticipates in the experiential processing and response to emotional cues.
Similarly, McRae et al. (2008) found positive correlations between
emotional awareness and activity in the dorsal ACC, middle frontal
gyrus, primary somatosensory cortex, inferior frontal gyrus and insula
during the processing of highly arousing, as opposed to less arousing,
emotional stimuli. The findings of both studies support the idea that
individual differences in emotional awareness are associated with
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increased ACC activity, which according to McRae et al. (2008) may
reflect greater attentional processing of emotional information. They
also suggest that individuals with higher emotional awareness are
better able to process highly arousing emotional stimuli. Thus, research
on controlled emotion processing suggests heightened activity in sev-
eral cortical areas implicated in attention allocation and arousal as a
function of trait emotional awareness.
Evidence that higher emotional awareness is associated with top-
down modulation of lower-level function comes from two different
sources. Evidence for modulation of level 1 (somatic sensation) func-
tion comes from Lane et al. (2011), which demonstrated that patients
at risk for sudden cardiac death owing to the Long QT Syndrome with
higher levels of emotional awareness had more differentiated reporting
of somatic symptoms in an ecological momentary assessment study.
Evidence for modulation of level 2 (action tendency) function comes
from Bre´jard and colleagues (2012) who observed that adolescents
with higher levels of emotional awareness were less impulsive. The
latter finding is consistent with expectations, in that, level 2 function
is action-oriented, whereas higher levels of emotional awareness in-
clude consideration of long-term consequences in addition to satisfac-
tion of immediate needs. In these contexts, the correlates of trait
emotional awareness were outcomes (symptoms, behaviors) that
involved conscious reflection and attention, particularly among those
who were more emotionally aware.
Less well studied is the bottom-up or input side of cross-level com-
munication. To do so requires examination of the relation between
trait emotional awareness and indices of lower-level functions at the
moment of confrontation with emotional stimuli. Based on the find-
ings by McRae et al. cited above it could be hypothesized that indi-
viduals who are more emotionally aware are more sensitive to
emotional information and have more intense responses to emotion
stimuli. Supporting evidence for this comes from research showing
that trait emotional awareness is positively correlated with skin con-
ductance responses to emotional stimuli (Lane et al., 2000a; McRae
et al., 2008). This means that greater trait emotional awareness is
characterized by stronger peripheral physiological arousal in response
to emotional stimuli. In an affective priming study (Suslow et al.,
2001), higher trait emotional awareness was associated with prolonged
processing times during the automatic perception of lexical and facial
emotion stimuli. These findings indicate that individuals with high
trait emotional awareness automatically allocate more attention to
emotional stimuli and react to them with greater physiological arousal.
It could be that greater arousal amplifies the input signal and greater
attentional processing enables the detection of greater complexity in
that signal. This would be consistent with the theory that greater emo-
tional awareness is associated with more complex emotion information
processing due to the differentiation and integration of the schemata
that participate in such processing, and would begin to explain the
mechanisms by which individuals who are more aware are able to
extract more information from exteroceptive emotional stimuli.
According to Zajonc’s (1980) affective primacy hypothesis, initial
responses to emotional stimuli are automatic and do not necessarily
require conscious awareness. It is plausible that individuals with higher
emotional awareness of their own and others’ feelings could be char-
acterized by stronger automatic reactions to emotional stimuli. The
effortless production of responses in basal emotion processing systems
of the brain such as the amygdala appears to provide an important
basis of information for higher processing systems. In case
higher-order neocortical areas receive poor input from the limbic
and somatosensory system, mental representation and differentiation
of emotional responses could be reduced. High automatic emotion
responsivity could thus be an important factor in promoting the
emotional development and differentiation of individuals.
To elicit unconscious affective reactions, researchers have used sub-
liminal presentations of emotional facial expressions (Zajonc, 2000). It
has been shown that masked happy and masked angry faces can cause
positive or negative reactions that are not accessible to conscious
awareness (Winkielman et al., 2005). Subliminal perception of emo-
tional facial expression is a complex process that implicates an inter-
active network of brain areas. Central neural structures underpinning
automatic emotion perception from the face are the amygdalae, thal-
amus, occipito-temporal visual cortical regions (including the fusiform
gyrus), the inferior frontal gyrus, the insula and the somatosensory
cortices (e.g. Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004; Phillips et al., 2004;
Liddell et al., 2005; Duan et al., 2010; Suslow et al., 2010). It has been
shown that facial mimicry occurs even during subliminal perception of
facial emotion (Dimberg et al., 2000; Rotteveel et al., 2001).
Observation of others’ facial expression of emotions activates brain
regions involved in experiencing similar emotions. The amygdala, in-
sula and anterior cingulate gyrus participate in processes of emotion
simulation (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012).
In this study, we examined for the first time the relationship between
trait emotional awareness and automatic brain reactivity to positive
and negative facial emotions in healthy adults. It was hypothesized that
high trait emotional awareness is related to increased reactivity in brain
structures implicated in the processing of masked facial emotions.
Moreover, we hypothesized that LEAS is positively related to affective
priming effects (i.e. high emotional awareness should be associated
with more shifts in implicit affect due to masked facial emotion com-
pared with low emotional awareness). By administering the affective
priming paradigm, we examined the relationship between trait emo-
tional awareness and affective resonance at an automatic processing
level. Affective resonance can be defined as a person’s tendency to
resonate and experience the same affect in response to viewing a dis-
play of that affect by another person. Affective resonance can be con-
sidered to be the original basis for interpersonal communication
(Tomkins, 1962).
To increase the probability of occurrence of behavioral affective
priming effects, we reduced visibility of primes compared with other
studies (e.g. Kugel et al., 2008; Reker et al., 2010) by using forward and
backward masking. To examine the effects of emotional primes on
implicit positive and negative affect separately, we combined affective
priming based on facial expression with items of the ‘Implicit Positive
and Negative Affect Test’ (IPANAT; Quirin et al., 2009). The IPANAT
has been shown to be a valid measure of implicit positive and negative
affect (Quirin et al., 2009, 2011). To evaluate the success of the mask-
ing procedure, participants took part in a forced-choice detection task
outside the scanner.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-two right-handed healthy volunteers participated in this func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. Six participants
had to be excluded from further analysis, five because of excessive
head motion in the scanner (>3 mm translation) and one because of
high depression score (Beck Depression Inventory, BDI  14). The
final sample consisted of 46 participants (23 women; mean
age¼ 23.5 years, s.d.¼ 2.7). None of the participants had current psy-
chiatric illness or any lifetime history of psychiatric condition accord-
ing to the criteria of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994), as diagnosed with the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (Wittchen et al.,
1997). Exclusion criteria of this study were any neurological abnorm-
alities, head trauma or loss of consciousness, psychotropic medication
and the standard magnetic resonance imaging contraindications.
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Handedness of subjects was measured by the Handedness
Questionnaire (Raczkowski et al., 1974). Visual acuity was tested be-
fore inclusion in the study. The local ethics committee approved the
procedure of the experiment. All participants gave their written con-
sent to participate in the study and were financially compensated on
study completion.
The LEAS (Lane et al., 1990; Subic-Wrana et al., 2001) was admini-
strated as a measure of trait emotional awareness. The LEAS is a writ-
ten performance task. The subject is asked to describe his or her
feelings and those of other people. In this study, we used the short
version of the LEAS with 10 vignettes. The mean LEAS total score was
35.9 (s.d.¼ 4.9). Cronbach’s alpha for the LEAS total score was
¼ 0.73. Higher scores on LEAS indicate higher emotional awareness.
The BDI-II (Beck and Steer, 1987; Hautzinger et al., 1994) was admin-
istered to assess current symptoms of depression. The mean BDI score
was 3.0 (s.d.¼ 3.5; ¼ 0.78). The State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (STAI;
Spielberger et al., 1970; Laux et al., 1981) was applied to assess trait
anxiety. In this sample, the mean trait anxiety score was 33.7
(s.d.¼ 8.2; ¼ 0.89). The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988; Krohne et al., 1996) was used to measure
trait positive affect (P) and trait negative affect (N). The mean score for
PANAS-P was 16.2 (s.d.¼ 2.5; ¼ 0.83). The mean score for
PANAS-N was 6.22 (s.d.¼ 0.9; ¼ 0.73).
fMRI experiment: stimulus materials and procedure
Colored photographs of 20 different individuals (Langner et al., 2010)
served as stimuli for the fMRI experiment. Four different emotional
facial expressions (i.e. happy, angry, fearful and neutral) were applied
as primes. Primes were shown with a sandwich masking technique
using letter strings (see Figure 1). The letter strings were drawn ran-
domly on each trial. The durations of the masks were chosen based on
the results of a pilot study (n¼ 10) conducted in our laboratory. The
experiment consisted of 80 trials: 20 per prime condition. Primes were
presented with restriction of no repetition of an individual and no
more than one repetition of a prime condition on consecutive trials.
The lexical material for the evaluation of the fit between artificial word
and emotion adjective was taken from the Implicit Positive and
Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin et al., 2009). We used five
artificial words (SAFME, VIKES, TUNBA, TALEP and BELNI) and
four adjectives: two were positive (happy, cheerful), two were negative
(helpless, inhibited). The duration of each trial was 9 s. The trial started
with a fixation cross lasting for 800 ms. Then, the prime stimulus
was presented (33 ms) forward and backward masked by the letter
mask (duration 33 ms each). During the following 8.1 s, partici-
pants had to evaluate the fit between artificial and emotion
word on a four-point Likert scale by pressing one of four buttons
(0, 1, 2 or 3). For half of the subjects, higher number indicated
higher fitting between artificial and emotion word. The other half of
the subjects indicated higher fittings by pressing lower numbers. The
shifts in implicit positive affect were calculated by subtracting implicit
positive affect score for the neutral face condition from those of the
happy face condition. Similarly, the shifts in implicit negative affect
were calculated by subtracting implicit negative affect score for the
neutral face condition from those of the angry or fearful face
conditions.
During the fMRI session, participants lay supine in the scanner
with extended arms holding fiber optic response pads with two
buttons in each hand. Half of the subjects indicated better fit be-
tween artificial word and adjective by pressing the right buttons,
half by pressing the left buttons. Word evaluations and reactions times
were recorded. Subjects’ head position was stabilized with cushions.
fMRI data acquisition and data analysis
Participants underwent structural and functional MRI scanning on a 3 T
scanner (Magnetom Verio, Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using a stand-
ard 12-channel head coil. For each participant, structural images were
acquired with a T1-weighted 3D MP-RAGE (Mugler and Brookeman,
1990). Magnetization preparation consisted of a non-selective inversion
pulse. The imaging parameters were TI¼ 650 ms, TR¼ 1300 ms,
TE¼ 3.5 ms, flip angle¼ 108, isotropic spatial resolution of 1 mm3, two
averages. Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) sensitive images were
collected using T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence
[matrix 642; 30 slices; resolution 3 mm 3 mm 4 mm; gap 0.8 mm;
repetition time (TR)¼ 2 s; echo time (TE)¼ 30 ms; flip angle
(FA)¼ 908; interleaved slice acquisition; 400 images]. Scanning planes
were oriented parallel to a line through the posterior and anterior com-
missures. fMRI data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
SPM5 (SPM5) (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The initial five func-
tional volumes were discarded to allow longitudinal magnetization to
reach equilibrium. Functional volumes were slice time-corrected
(middle slice as reference), realigned to the temporally first image and
corrected for movement-induced image distortions (six-parameter rigid
Fig. 1 Sequence of events within trials in the affective priming task. In our example, a trial with an angry prime is shown.
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body affine realignment). Functional and anatomical images were co-
registered. Anatomical images were then segmented, including normal-
ization to a standard stereotaxic space using the T1 template by the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) delivered with SPM. The normal-
ization parameters were then applied to the functional EPI series. On the
functional data, spatial smoothing was performed using a three-dimen-
sional Gaussian filter of 6 mm full-width at half-maximum.
We used an event-related design. For each participant, trials were
averaged for each prime condition (happy, angry, fearful and neutral)
resulting in four average trials for each subject. First level t-contrasts
were calculated by contrasting each emotional condition to the neutral
one (i.e. happy vs neutral, angry vs neutral and fearful vs neutral). Then
one-sample t-tests were performed on activation data for the three
emotion conditions (compared with the neutral face condition) to
obtain main effects of emotions. Finally, the relationship between
trait emotional awareness and brain activation during processing of
masked facial emotions was evaluated [controlling for positive affect-
ivity (PANAS-P)] using multiple regression as implemented in SPM5.
In contrast to positive affectivity, negative affectivity (PANAS-N) did
not change the fMRI findings, so the latter results are not further
presented and discussed. The general linear model was used to
model the effects of interest and other confounding effects.
First, region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were carried out focusing on
the amygdala. It has been repeatedly shown that the amygdala is acti-
vated during the subliminal perception of facial emotion (e.g. Whalen
et al., 1998; Dannlowski et al., 2007). The amygdala was defined ac-
cording to Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. (2002), and the amygdala mask was
created by means of the Wake Forest University (WFU) pickatlas
(Maldjian et al., 2003). In the ROI analyses, significant clusters are
reported corrected for search volume (P< 0.05). In addition, explora-
tory whole-brain analyses were conducted for each contrast using a
statistical threshold of P< 0.001 (uncorrected) and a spatial extent of
10 contiguous voxels.
Detection task
To evaluate the success of the masking procedure, a forced-choice
detection task was administered outside the scanner after the fMRI
experiment. The detection task had the same presentation conditions
and the same stimuli as the fMRI experiment. The task consisted of 40
trials, 10 trials per emotion condition. Participants were presented with
a photograph of an emotional face preceded and followed by pictures
with letter strings (sandwich masking). Participants’ task was to label
the expression of the face. Subjects were informed that they would see
facial expressions depicting happy, angry, fearful, sad and neutral emo-
tions (though sad faces were actually not shown) and asked to indicate
which prime was presented between the two letter masks via button
press. The non-parametric index of sensitivity A’ proposed by
Aaronson and Watts (1987) was used to assess detection performance.
It represents an extension of the sensitivity index defined by Grier
(1971) and is appropriate for signal detection tasks in which the
false alarm rate exceeds the hit rate. The A’ index takes into account
hit and false alarm rates and indicates chance performance at A’¼ 0.5.
We calculated a sensitivity index for each facial expression condition
(e.g. happy) relative to the other conditions (in this example angry,
fearful and neutral).
RESULTS
Trait emotional awareness and measures of affectivity
The LEAS was not correlated with STAI and BDI (r¼ 0.05 and
r¼ 0.09, P> 0.55, two-tailed) or PANAS-N (r¼0.01, P> 0.95, two-
tailed). However, the LEAS was significantly related to positive affect as
assessed by the PANAS-P (r¼ 0.38, P< 0.01, two-tailed).
Behavioral performance in the fMRI experiment:
shifts in implicit affect
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVAs) on the implicit
affect scores with prime (happy, neutral, angry and fearful) and valence
(positive and negative) as within-subject factors was conducted to
examine whether changes in implicit affect differ as a function of
prime condition and valence. The main effects prime [F (3,43)¼ 3.95,
P< 0.05] and valence [F (1,45)¼ 31.6, P< 0.01] and the interaction
prime valence [F (1,45)¼ 5.65 P< 0.01] were significant. The mean
changes for the different prime conditions are depicted in Figure 2.
Fig. 2 Mean implicit positive and negative affect as a function of primes. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM). The figure depicts mean implicit positive and negative affect following the
presentation of masked happy, neutral, angry and fearful facial emotions.
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Post hoc comparisons revealed significant differences in the increase
of implicit positive affect in the happy vs neutral prime condition
[t (45)¼ 3.11P< 0.01]. There were no significant differences for the
implicit negative affect. We correlated the difference score for the im-
plicit positive affect in the happy against neutral prime condition with
trait emotional awareness. The LEAS was positively correlated with this
score even after controlling for trait positive affect (r¼ 0.34, P< 0.05,
two-tailed; see Figure 3). Hence, participants with more emotional
awareness showed more prime valence congruent shifts in implicit
positive affect.
Detection task performance
All sensitivity values A’ were at chance-level performance: for happy
faces 0.51 (se¼ 0.01), for angry faces 0.49 (se¼ 0.01), for fearful faces
0.52 (se¼ 0.01) and for neutral faces 0.46 (se¼ 0.03). None of the
sensitivity values were significantly different from 0.5 (P> 0.05), sug-
gesting chance-level performance of study participants.
Neuroimaging results
Main effects of masked emotional faces on amygdala activation
Masked presentation of happy faces (compared with neutral faces)
activated the bilateral amygdala (see Figure 4). No amygdala activation
was revealed for masked angry and masked fearful faces.
Main effects of masked emotion faces on brain
activation: whole-brain analysis
There was significantly more neural activation in response to masked
happy compared with masked neutral faces in several regions of the
brain (see Table 1 for details). Masked presentation of happy expres-
sion activated inferior and middle frontal, superior temporal, inferior
and superior parietal areas and middle occipital regions as well as
cerebellar and insular areas (see Table 1 for details). Masked happy
faces activated also the basal ganglia and thalamus.
Masked fearful faces (compared with masked neutral faces) activated
only areas in the right middle frontal gyrus [BA45, peak voxel xyz, 51,
20, 34 (MNI coordinates), cluster size: 12, Z-score¼ 4.03]. No brain
activation was revealed for masked angry faces compared with masked
neutral faces.
Correlations of trait emotional awareness with amygdala
response to masked emotion faces controlling for trait
positive affect (PANAS-P)
The voxel-wise ROI analysis of the amygdalae yielded significant positive
correlations between LEAS and amygdala reactivity to masked happy
faces (see Figure 5 for details). Importantly, there were no significant
correlations in the opposite direction for happy faces. No positive (or
negative) correlations between trait emotional awareness and amygdala
response to masked fearful or masked angry faces were observed.
Correlations of trait emotional awareness with brain responses
to masked happy faces controlling for trait positive affect
(PANAS-P)
Trait emotional awareness was positively correlated with activation of
the middle and medial frontal gyrus, the cingulate and lingual gyrus,
precentral and postcentral regions in response to masked happy faces
(see Table 2 and Figure 6 for details). Moreover, there were positive
correlations between the LEAS and activation of the inferior parietal
lobule, basal ganglia, thalamic and cerebellar regions in response to
masked happy facial expression. There were no negative correlations
between LEAS and brain response to masked happy faces.
Correlations of trait emotional awareness with brain responses
to masked fearful and angry faces controlling for trait positive
affect (PANAS-P)
Trait emotional awareness was positively correlated with response of
the cingulate gyrus to masked fearful faces (BA31, peak voxel xyz, 24,
37, 34 (MNI coordinates), cluster size: 20, Z-score¼ 4.18; and BA24,
Fig. 3 Shifts in implicit positive affect due to masked happy as compared with masked neutral faces as a function of trait emotional awareness (LEAS) [r¼ .34, P< .05, two-tailed, controlled for positive affect
(PANAS-P)]. The shifts were calculated by subtracting implicit positive affect scores for the neutral face condition from those of the happy face condition.
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peak voxel xyz, 18, 5, 34, cluster size: 12, Z-score¼ 3.70). There were
positive correlations between LEAS and activation of parietal areas
(BA40, peak voxel xyz, 33, 40, 31, cluster size: 12, Z-score¼ 4.26;
and BA40, peak voxel xyz, 51, 31, 25, cluster size: 13,
Z-score¼ 4.04) and nucleus caudatus (extending to putamen) in re-
sponse to angry facial expression (peak voxel xyz, 21, 14, 22, cluster
size: 23, Z-score¼ 3.79). There were no negative correlations between
trait emotional awareness and brain response to masked fearful or
masked angry faces.
DISCUSSION
In this study, the relationship between trait emotional awareness and
automatic brain reactivity to positive and negative facial emotions was
investigated in healthy adults. The results in the objective test of prime
awareness indicate that subjects were unaware of the emotional primes
presented during the fMRI experiment. Our hypotheses were con-
firmed in part. As expected, positive correlations were observed be-
tween trait emotional awareness and automatic reactivity in brain
structures implicated in the processing of masked facial emotions
and the development of implicit affect. However, these associations
were found primarily for masked happy faces and, to a much lesser
extent, for masked fearful and masked angry faces. Importantly, no
negative correlations between trait emotional awareness and brain re-
activity to masked facial emotions were found in our study. Thus, our
data indicate that individuals with high emotional awareness show
more activation in brain areas involved in emotion processing and
simulation during the subliminal perception of happy facial emotion
compared with individuals with low emotional awareness. These find-
ings were independent of habitual positive affect.
The present fMRI data suggest that masked happy faces produced
activation in many brain regions, which are known to be involved in
the automatic processing of facial emotions (i.e. inferior and middle
frontal, superior temporal and middle occipital gyri, insula, somato-
sensory cortex, cerebellar regions, basal ganglia, thalamus and amyg-
dala; e.g. Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004; Rauch et al., 2007;
Schutter et al., 2009; Suslow et al., 2009, 2010; Juruena et al., 2010).
In contrast, masked fearful faces activated only the middle frontal
gyrus, and masked angry faces showed no brain activation compared
with masked neutral faces. This differential pattern of activation par-
allels the behavioral findings, which showed significant positive prim-
ing (based on happy facial expression) but no negative priming effects
(based on fearful or angry facial expression). An explanation for the
absence of amygdala response to fearful faces in our experiment could
be the type of mask used. According to Kim et al. (2010), the amygdala
response to fearful faces masked by pattern images substantially de-
creases compared with amygdala response to fearful faces masked by
neutral faces. Diminished amygdala activation to fearful facial expres-
sion in the context of pattern masks might be caused by interactions of
the amygdala with other neural systems. In our task, a sand-
wich-masking procedure was used consisting of randomly drawn let-
ters. It is possible that the presentation of letter strings activated
higher-order cortical structures, which inhibited the response of the
amygdala. In sum, the present affective priming task produced activa-
tion and processing effects primarily for positive facial expression on a
neural and behavioral level (see below for a detailed discussion of
possible mood-congruent processing effects in our sample of healthy
subjects). In the absence of a significant main effect of brain activation
due to negative priming effects, an association with trait emotional
awareness would be extremely difficult to detect.
Trait emotional awareness was found to be positively associated with
activation in the primary somatosensory cortex, inferior parietal
lobule, dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus, middle frontal and cerebellar
areas, thalamus, putamen and amygdala in response to masked happy
faces. This means, on the one hand, that high trait emotional aware-
ness was associated with high responsivity to positive facial emotion in
subcortical systems, which are relevant for the detection of biologically
relevant stimuli. It is well-known that the amygdala is involved in the
assessment of emotional significance (Davis and Whalen, 2001;
Adolphs, 2010), the modulation of vigilance to enhance subsequent
information processing throughout the brain and, like the pulvinar
thalamus, the coordination of cortical networks during evaluation of
visual stimuli (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). A close relationship be-
tween amygdala and striatal activity has been reported during the pro-
cessing of reward relevant stimuli (Ousdal et al., 2012). The thalamus is
part of a rapid subcortical path by which low-level visual information
can reach the amygdala without conscious awareness (Phillips et al.,
Table 1 Brain regions showing significantly increased activation to masked happy faces
as compared with masked neutral faces
Brain region Hemisphere Peak coordinates Size Z-score
Inferior frontal gyrus, BA47 L 18 29 14 17 3.82
Middle frontal gyrus, BA46 L 45 41 4 31 4.05
Middle frontal gyrus, BA9 R 51 20 31 116 4.14
to middle frontal gyrus, BA46 R 48 23 19 3.67
Middle frontal gyrus, BA6 L 30 14 52 10 3.56
Superior temporal gyrus, BA22 L 51 19 8 30 4.13
Superior temporal gyrus, BA22 R 54 46 7 129 3.87
to superior temporal gyrus, BA13 R 48 49 13 3.84
Temporal lobe, subgyral, BA37 R 48 43 14 21 3.85
Inferior parietal lobule, BA40 L 51 52 46 16 3.67
Superior parietal lobule, BA7 L 30 64 52 17 3.37
Lingual gyrus, BA18 R 33 70 14 41 3.96
Middle occipital gyrus, BA19 R 24 97 13 17 4.16
Occipital lobe, cuneus, BA19 R 27 85 34 59 3.73
Insula, BA 13 L 42 17 10 54 4.33
Putamen R 24 23 11 25 4.03
Caudate nucleus, caudate body L 9 8 7 38 3.86
to thalamus L 9 7 10 3.48
Caudate nucleus, caudate body R 12 5 7 28 3.68
Cerebellum, pyramis L 6 73 35 20 4.01
Cerebellum, pyramis R 12 73 38 28 4.36
Hemisphere, peak voxel coordinates in MNI space, cluster extent and the associated Z-values are
shown. The activations are significant at P < .001 (uncorrected), 10 voxel cluster threshold.
Fig. 4 Response of the amygdalae to masked happy faces compared with masked neutral faces (ROI
analysis): left amygdala [peak voxel xyz, 27, 1, 20 (MNI coordinates), cluster size: 8,
Z-score¼ 2.03] and right amygdala (peak voxel xyz, 21, 2, 14, cluster size: 8, Z-score¼ 2.37,
and xyz, 36, 2, 23, cluster size: 7, Z-score¼ 2.06). All activations are significant at P< 0.05,
corrected for search volume. The color bar (t value) indicates the strength of activation. BOLD
responses are superimposed on MNI standard brain template. Reader’s right is subjects’ right.
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2004; Liddell et al., 2005). The thalamic nuclei serve a variety of func-
tions in the brain beyond relaying sensory information, which com-
prise the initiation and coordination of motor behavior
(Schmahmann, 2003). Interestingly, amygdala, thalamus and basal
ganglia have been reported to be activated during imitation of happy
facial expression (Pohl et al., 2013). In sum, according to our data,
individuals with high levels of emotional awareness appear to be char-
acterized by an enhanced reactivity in subcortical areas implicated in
rapid stimulus evaluation and allocation of processing resources.
On the other hand, trait emotional awareness was also found to be
positively related to response of several cortical areas such as the pri-
mary somatosensory cortex (SI) and inferior parietal lobule during the
subliminal perception of happy faces. It has been shown repeatedly that
the inferior parietal lobule is involved in the observation as well as in
the imitation of emotional facial expression (Carr et al., 2003;
Hennenlotter et al., 2005; van der Gaag et al., 2007). The primary
somatosensory cortex (SI) is known to be critically involved in the
processes of emotional mimicry and simulation (Adolphs et al.,
2000). Primary somatosensory regions are implicated in simulating
aspects of the body states associated with the viewed emotional sta-
teincluding proprioceptive and somatovisceral sensations (Heberlein
and Adolphs, 2007; Heberlein and Atkinson, 2009). According to the
shared-substrates model of emotion recognition identification of other
persons’ emotional states is mediated by internally generated somato-
sensory representations that simulate how the other individual feels
when showing a certain facial expression (Heberlein and Adolphs,
2007). Such vicarious responding has also been discussed in the con-
text of empathic responses (Preston and de Waal, 2002). Interestingly,
previous psychological research has reported that trait emotional
awareness is related to enhanced empathy (Ciarrochi et al., 2003;
Igarashi et al., 2011). Lane (2008) has pointed out that the somatosen-
sory and parietal cortex could participate in the experience of the
somatic sensations associated with implicit responses.
Finally, trait emotional awareness was correlated with activation in
areas of the ACC and cerebellum in response to masked happy faces.
The ACC is an integral part of the limbic system and participates in
emotion formation and processing. Specifically, dorsal regions of the
ACC are involved in the appraisal of emotion (Etkin et al., 2011). The
cerebellum is incorporated into distributed neural circuits subserving
emotion perception and social interaction (Schmahmann, 2010).
Increased cerebellar responses to masked happy faces could subserve
processes of increased implicit attention for positive social stimuli
(Schutter et al., 2009). All in all, the present neuroimaging data
show that trait emotional awareness is positively associated with acti-
vation in brain areas responsible for rapid stimulus evaluation and
emotion simulation during the subliminal perception of happy facial
expression. These findings are in line with the idea that emotional
awareness is characterized by an enhanced affective resonance to
others at an automatic processing level (Ciarrochi et al., 2003;
Igarashi et al., 2011).
It is interesting to note in this context that previous studies have
demonstrated a positive relationship of level of emotional awareness
with verbal and non-verbal recognition of facial emotions (Lane et al.,
1996, 2000b). In the light of the present results, it appears possible that
more spontaneous activation in brain areas implicated in emotion
simulation could have been a factor promoting the identification of
emotion from facial expression in high compared with low trait emo-
tional awareness.
Our behavioral results partially confirm the hypothesis that the
LEAS is positively related to shifts in implicit affect owing to masked
facial emotion. High trait emotional awareness was associated with
stronger shifts in implicit positive affect caused by happy facial expres-
sion. Importantly, in our experiment, presentation of masked happy
faces induced significant increases in implicit positive affect compared
with the presentation of neutral faces, but there was no indication that
masked negative (i.e. angry and fearful) faces elicited implicit negative
affect. The present data suggest that high emotional awareness is char-
acterized by an enhanced resonance to others’ positive affects at an
automatic processing level. Affective resonance refers to a person’s
tendency to experience the same affect in response to viewing a display
of that affect by another person. Individuals with high levels of emo-
tional awareness appear to develop stronger implicit positive affects in
response to others’ brief facial expressions compared with those with
low levels of emotional awareness. These results of an enhanced affect-
ive resonance are consistent with those of previous studies showing
that individuals with high emotional awareness allocate involuntarily
more attention to emotional stimuli (Suslow et al., 2001) and react
with more physiological arousal to them (Lane et al., 2000a; McRae
et al., 2008). Thus, there is evidence that functioning at high levels of
emotional awareness (i.e. levels of explicit processes of emotional ex-
perience) goes along with pronounced implicit affects and reactions
(bodily sensations and automatic attention allocation). This does not
Table 2 Brain regions showing significantly increased activation to masked happy faces
as a function of trait emotional awareness (LEAS) controlling for trait positive affect
(PANAS-P)
Brain region Hemisphere Peak coordinates Size Z-score
Medial frontal gyrus, BA32 L 15 8 49 16 4.18
Middle frontal gyrus, BA46 R 36 35 13 19 3.63
Cingulate Gyrus, BA24 L 18 16 40 56 4.54
to precentral gyrus, BA4 L 30 19 46 3.59
to postcentral gyrus, BA3 L 39 25 52 3.38
Postcentral gyrus, BA2 R 33 22 34 43 4.08
Postcentral gyrus, BA3 L 24 40 52 13 3.72
Inferior parietal lobule, BA40 L 51 31 25 29 3.68
to postcentral gyrus, BA2 L 39 28 31 3.58
Occipital lobe, lingual gyrus L 12 61 8 15 3.64
Claustrum L 27 22 19 107 4.68
to thalamus L 18 19 4 4.05
Putamen R 24 10 13 10 3.73
Cerebellum, culmen R 12 55 14 19 3.63
Hemisphere, peak voxel coordinates in MNI space, cluster extent and the associated Z-values are
shown. The activations are significant at P< .001 (uncorrected), 10 voxel cluster threshold.
Fig. 5 Regions within the amygdalae showing positive correlations between response to masked
happy faces and trait emotional awareness (LEAS) controlling for trait positive affect (PANAS-P): left
amygdala (peak voxel xyz, 27, 7, 17 (MNI coordinates), cluster size: 25, Z-score¼ 2.95) and
right amygdala (peak voxel xyz, 30, 1, 23, cluster size: 20, Z-score¼ 3.05). Activations are
significant at P < 0.005, corrected for search volume. The color bar (t value) indicates the strength of
correlation. BOLD are superimposed on MNI standard brain template. Reader’s right is subjects’ right.
686 SCAN (2015) V. Lichev et al.
[28.4.2015–12:30pm] [680–689] Paper: OP-SCAN140106
Copyedited by: VM
contradict assumptions of the levels of emotional awareness theory
according to which functioning at a high level can modify but does
not eliminate the function of previous levels (Lane, 2008).
It is possible that the positive mood state of our healthy study par-
ticipants induced mood-congruent response biases favoring the pro-
cessing of happy facial expression. This might have facilitated the
detection of associations between emotional awareness and automatic
brain response to happy facial expression in our sample. In our study,
we found evidence for positive priming owing to masked happy faces
(i.e. there was a positive prime valence congruent shift in implicit affect
caused by happy faces compared with neutral faces) but our results did
not provide any evidence for negative priming effects elicited by
masked angry or fearful faces (i.e. no negative prime valence congruent
shifts in implicit affect were found for angry or fearful faces compared
with neutral faces). The results from the first studies examining shifts
in affective or liking evaluations owing to masked facial emotions on
the basis of the affective priming paradigm (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993;
Murphy et al., 1995) suggested comparably pronounced effects of posi-
tive and negative facial expression on evaluations. Compared with
neutral expression, angry facial expression led to more negative evalu-
ations of subsequently presented stimuli, whereas happy facial expres-
sion elicited more positive evaluations of subsequently presented
stimuli. However, subsequent behavioral studies on affective priming
in which samples of healthy adults were examined frequently failed to
find negative priming effects. There are four studies using sad and
happy faces as emotional primes in which (valence congruent) affective
priming effects were only observed for happy but not for sad faces
(Suslow et al., 2003; Wong and Root, 2003; Dannlowski and Suslow,
2006; Donges et al., 2012). In addition, results from three other studies
administering happy and angry faces as emotional primes indicate
(valence congruent) affective priming only for happy but not for
angry faces (Rotteveel et al., 2001, experiment 1; Dannlowski et al.,
2007; Paul et al., 2012). Finally, in the study of Almeida et al. (2013),
affective priming for happy faces was stronger than that for angry faces.
In all of the aforementioned affective priming studies, participants
were unaware of the primes as controlled by measures of subjective
or objective awareness.
It can be concluded that our findings of significant priming based on
happy faces but no priming based on negative faces are consistent with
results from many previous investigations examining automatic influ-
ences of masked facial emotion on affective or evaluative processes.
The healthy participants of our study tended to show mood-congruent
priming effects. The selective susceptibility or responsiveness to posi-
tive social information at an automatic processing level as found in this
study is similar to observations made in research on attention in de-
pressed and normal individuals. According to these findings, healthy
(as opposed to depressed) subjects are characterized by attentional
biases favoring positive stimuli (Gotlib et al., 1988) and avoiding nega-
tive stimuli (McCabe and Gotlib, 1995; Karparova et al., 2007). This
pattern of attention allocation has been termed positive or protective
bias. There is evidence that protective biases away from negative in-
formation can operate at an early stage of information processing in
healthy subjects (Leyman et al., 2009). It has also been shown in elec-
trophysiological studies that normal individuals manifest an early re-
sponse bias for positive information (Deldin et al., 2001). As noted
above, the absence of a negative priming effect might explain the
Fig. 6 Brain regions showing positive correlations between response to masked happy faces and trait emotional awareness (LEAS) controlling for trait positive affect (PANAS-P): (A) coronal view: activation in
the left postcentral gyrus [BA3; extending to precentral and cingulate gyrus; peak voxel xyz, 39, 25, 52 (MNI coordinates), cluster size: 56, Z-score¼ 3.38], left thalamus (extending to claustrum; peak voxel
xyz, 18, 19, 4, cluster size: 107, Z-score¼ 4.05) and right postcentral gyrus (BA2; peak voxel xyz, 33, 22, 34, cluster size: 43, Z-score¼ 4.08); (B) coronal view: activation in the left inferior parietal lobule
(BA40, peak voxel xyz, 51, 31, 25, cluster size: 29, Z-score¼ 3.68) and right postcentral gyrus (BA2; peak voxel xyz, 33, 22, 34, cluster size: 43, Z-score¼ 4.08); (C) sagittal view: activation in the right
putamen (peak voxel xyz, 24, 10, 13, cluster size: 10, Z-score¼ 3.73); (D) axial view: activation in the left thalamus (extending to claustrum; peak voxel xyz, 18, 19, 4, cluster size: 107, Z-score¼ 4.05),
right putamen (peak voxel xyz, 24, 10, 13, cluster size: 10, Z-score¼ 3.73) and right middle frontal gyrus (BA46, peak voxel xyz, 36, 35, 13, cluster size: 19, Z-score¼ 3.63). All activations are significant at
P < 0.001 (uncorrected). The color bar (t value) indicates the strength of correlation. BOLD responses are superimposed on MNI standard brain template. Reader’s right is subjects’ right.
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failure to detect associations between emotional awareness and nega-
tive evaluative shifts in our sample.
To further clarify the issue of a relationship between emotional
awareness and negative affective priming, it appears advisable to include
clinical subjects such as depressed, anxious or schizophrenia patients
in future studies. These patients have shown (mood-congruent) nega-
tive affective priming effects in previous studies (Suslow et al., 2003,
2013; Dannlowski et al., 2006). It would be interesting to examine
whether patients with higher trait emotional awareness manifest stron-
ger negative priming. We assume that trait emotional awareness can
basically affect the processing of negative as well as positive stimuli but
that the detection of relationships may depend on the mood character-
istics and processing biases of study participants.
These data suggest that the extent of reflective awareness of feelings
may also derive from the extent and intensity of implicit affective
reactions. High responsiveness of limbic and somatosensory areas to
emotional signals of low intensity in everyday life could make the
recognition of subtle emotions less difficult. People who develop auto-
matically stronger bodily feelings to emotional stimuli might become
more easily aware of these spontaneous affective reactions and make
them more frequently the objects of conscious reflection, resulting in
reports reflecting more complex processing of emotional information.
Less detailed processing and somatosensory representation of facial
emotional expressions could contribute to a decreased ability to
draw inferences about the emotional and motivational significance of
fundamental interpersonal signals. Reduced activation in limbic areas
when attempting to feel other people’s feelings or retrieving their own
emotional episodes has been reported previously for people with
decreased emotional awareness (see Kano and Fukudo, 2013, for an
overview). Low spontaneous cerebral responsivity to external emo-
tional triggers as found in our study coincides with the empirical im-
pression of clinicians that people with decreased affect awareness look
unaffected and emotionally dull (Moriguchi and Komaki, 2013).
Previous research addressing the neural correlates of trait emotional
awareness has focused exclusively on explicit emotion processing. Lane
et al. (1998) and McRae et al. (2008) reported more activation pri-
marily of the ACC during film- or recall-induced emotion and during
viewing of emotional pictures in individuals with higher emotional
awareness [see also Frewen et al.’s study (2008) in which similar results
have been obtained in the control group]. Our data on early stages of
emotion processing complement the previous findings by showing that
subjects with high levels of emotional awareness activate brain regions
implicated in evaluation and affective resonance more strongly during
automatic emotion perception compared with those with low levels of
emotional awareness. These data suggest that more emotionally aware
individuals could have more neurally elaborated emotional reactions
and representations even before they are consciously aware of the
emotions. This could mean that the interoceptive information that
forms the basis for reporting on experience is possibly more detailed
or elaborated even before it is put into words in people who are more
emotionally aware. Quirin and Lane (2012) have argued that the re-
flective construction of emotional experience requires the integration
of implicit and explicit emotional processes. It appears that greater
awareness does not just involve better ability to put emotions into
words or appreciate complexity in one’s own experience and that of
others; it seems to involve a more elaborated type of bottom-up emo-
tion processing and an enhanced automatic affective resonance to
others that creates the possibility for enhanced emotional awareness.
This is consistent with emotional awareness theory (Lane and
Schwartz, 1987; Lane, 2008), which states that more detailed schemata
for processing emotional stimuli lead to more detailed emotional in-
formation processing independent of and preceding the reporting
function itself.
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